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United States v. Castleman:               
The Meaning of Domestic Violence 
Emily J. Sack* 
In 2001, James Alvin Castleman pled guilty to having 
“intentionally or knowingly cause[d] bodily injury” to the mother 
of his child, in violation of a Tennessee state criminal law.1  Seven 
years later, federal law enforcement authorities learned that 
Castleman was selling firearms on the black market.2  Castleman 
was indicted on two counts of violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9), a 
federal law prohibiting possession of a firearm by anyone 
previously convicted of a “misdemeanor crime of domestic 
violence.”3  Castleman moved to dismiss the indictment on the 
ground that his conviction in Tennessee did not qualify as a 
“misdemeanor crime of domestic violence,” which required the 
“use or attempted use of physical force.”4  The federal district 
court granted the motion to dismiss, and the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Sixth Circuit affirmed.5  The U.S. Supreme Court granted 
 
* Professor of Law, Roger Williams University School of Law. 
 1.  United States v. Castleman, 134 S. Ct. 1405, 1409 (2014) (alteration 
in original) (quoting TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-111(b) (Supp. 2002)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 2.  Id. 
 3.  Id.; 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) (2012).  Section 922(g)(9) states:  
It shall be unlawful for any person . . . who has been convicted in any 
court of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence, to ship or 
transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or possess in or affecting 
commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or to receive any firearm or 
ammunition which has been shipped or transported in interstate or 
foreign commerce. 
 4.  Castleman, 134 S. Ct. at 1409 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(A)(ii)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 5.  Id.; see also United States v. Castleman, 695 F.3d 582 (6th Cir. 
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certiorari to resolve a split in the circuits on the degree of force 
necessary for an offense to qualify as a “misdemeanor crime of 
domestic violence”;6 in 2014, it reversed the Sixth Circuit’s 
judgment and gave a broad reading to the meaning of force in the 
context of domestic violence.7 
United States v. Castleman marks the latest step in a long 
series of challenges to the federal domestic violence firearms 
prohibition and the second time in five years that this provision 
has reached the Supreme Court.8  Though the case concerned 
what might appear to be a somewhat technical question of 
statutory interpretation—the meaning of “the use of physical 
force” in the provision defining a “misdemeanor crime of domestic 
violence”—more profoundly, it involved a struggle over the 
meaning and dynamics of domestic violence.  Castleman’s 
significance lies in the nuanced understanding of domestic 
violence expressed by the majority, which could have impact well 
beyond its reading of the firearms prohibition at issue in the case. 
To provide context for the debate in Castleman, first, I briefly 
explore the motivation for the domestic violence gun prohibition 
and the history of legal challenges to the provision since its 
enactment.  Next, I examine both Castleman’s majority opinion by 
Justice Sotomayor and the concurring opinion authored by Justice 
Scalia, focusing on their competing understandings of domestic 
violence.  I then raise yet one more challenge to the firearms 
prohibition that has been percolating and may be strengthened by 
the Castleman holding—a claim that the statute is 
unconstitutional on Second Amendment grounds.  However, 
whatever further attacks on the firearms ban may lie ahead, I 
 
2012); United States v. Castleman, CR. No. 08-20240-Ml, 2010 WL 711179 
(W.D. Tenn. Feb. 22, 2010). 
 6.  United States v. Castleman, 134 S. Ct. 49 (2013) (mem.) (granting 
certiorari).  Compare United States v. White, 606 F.3d 144, 156 (4th Cir. 
2010) (applying a more narrow definition of physical force to include only 
force “capable of causing physical pain or injury to the victim”), and 
Castleman, 695 F.3d at 587 (similarly), and United States v. Hays, 526 F.3d 
674, 679 (10th Cir. 2008) (similarly), and United States v. Belless, 338 F.3d 
1063, 1068 (9th Cir. 2003) (similarly), with United States v. Griffith, 455 F.3d 
1339, 1342 (11th Cir. 2006) (utilizing a broader definition of physical force), 
and United States v. Nason, 269 F.3d 10, 18 (1st Cir. 2001) (similarly), and 
United States v. Smith, 171 F.3d 617, 621 (8th Cir. 1999) (similarly).  
 7.  Castleman, 134 S. Ct. at 1410. 
 8.  See United States v. Hayes, 555 U.S. 415, 418 (2009). 
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conclude that the Court’s conception of domestic violence will have 
lasting influence on a range of legal issues. 
I. GUNS, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, AND 18 U.S.C. §922(g)(9) 
As the Supreme Court put it in United States v. Hayes, 
“[f]irearms and domestic strife are a potentially deadly 
combination.”9  There is a strong link between access to firearms 
and domestic violence fatalities.  As Senator Lautenberg, the chief 
sponsor of section 922(g)(9), stated, “[d]omestic violence, no matter 
how it is labeled, leads to more domestic violence, and guns in the 
hands of convicted wife beaters leads to death.”10  As one study 
noted, there is a high correlation between access to guns and 
intimate partner homicide; “[w]hen a gun was in the house, an 
abused woman was 6 times more likely than other abused women 
to be killed.”11  Other studies have found that anywhere from over 
half to more than two-thirds of all victims of intimate partner 
homicides were killed by guns.12  As Senator Wellstone, another 
supporter of section 922(g)(9), put it, “the only difference between 
a battered woman and a dead woman is the presence of a gun.”13 
In 1996, Congress amended the federal Gun Control Act of 
1968 to prohibit firearm possession by anyone convicted of a 
“misdemeanor crime of domestic violence.”14  Though the Act had 
long banned convicted felons from possessing firearms, the 
extension to domestic violence misdemeanors was necessary 
because domestic violence offenders were routinely undercharged 
or convicted of less serious offenses than their behavior 
warranted.  As Senator Lautenberg explained, the felony ban was 
not keeping firearms out of the hands of domestic abusers, since 
“many people who engage in serious spousal or child abuse 
 
 9.  Id. at 427. 
 10.  142 CONG. REC. 22986 (1996) (statement of Sen. Frank Lautenberg).   
 11.  Jacquelyn C. Campbell et al., Assessing Risk Factors for Intimate 
Partner Homicide, NAT’L. INST. JUST. J., Nov. 2003, at 14, 16; accord 
Castleman, 134 S. Ct. at 1408–09. 
 12.  Emily J. Sack, Confronting the Issue of Gun Seizure in Domestic 
Violence Cases, 6 J. CENTER FOR FAM. CHILD. & CTS. 3, 3 (2005).  
 13.  142 CONG. REC. 22986 (statement of Sen. Paul Wellstone); accord 
Castleman, 134 S. Ct. at 1409. 
 14.  18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) (2012).  Congress previously had passed a 
prohibition on gun possession for anyone subject to a qualifying protection 
order.  18 U.S.C § 922(g)(8).  
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ultimately are not charged with or convicted of felonies.”15  
Therefore, extending the ban to persons convicted of misdemeanor 
domestic violence offenses would “close this dangerous loophole.”16 
The gun prohibition applies to a person convicted of a 
misdemeanor crime of domestic violence at any time, even if the 
conviction was prior to the enactment of section 922(g)(9).17  The 
ban is permanent, and unlike other gun control legislation, it 
contains no exemption for police, military personnel, or 
government officials.18  For all of these reasons, as well as general 
hostility to gun prohibitions from some quarters, section 922(g)(9) 
has been subject to extensive criticism and multiple legal 
challenges.19 
II. LEGAL CHALLENGES TO THE DOMESTIC VIOLENCE FIREARMS 
PROHIBITION 
A. Claims in the Lower Courts 
Challenges to section 922(g)(9) began soon after its 
implementation and were based on a number of different legal 
grounds, many of them constitutional.  However, despite the 
multitude of legal attacks, these challenges have consistently been 
unsuccessful. 
One common early claim centered on the Commerce Clause.  
Defendants attempted to rely on United States v. Lopez, in which 
the Supreme Court had invalidated a federal firearms possession 
statute on Commerce Clause grounds.20  Particularly after the 
Supreme Court struck down another federal domestic violence 
provision on these grounds in United States v. Morrison,21 
 
 15.  142 CONG. REC. 22985 (statement of Sen. Frank Lautenberg).  
 16.  142 CONG. REC. 22986 (statement of Sen. Frank Lautenberg). 
 17.  See, e.g., United States v. Pfeifer, 371 F.3d 430, 436–37 (8th Cir. 
2004); United States v. Hemmings, 258 F.3d 587, 594 (7th Cir. 2001); United 
States v. Mitchell, 209 F.3d 319, 322–23 (4th Cir. 2000). 
 18.  See ELIZABETH M. SCHNEIDER, CHERYL HANNA, EMILY J. SACK & 
JUDITH G. GREENBERG, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND THE LAW: THEORY AND 
PRACTICE 404 (3d ed. 2013).  See also 18 U.S.C. § 925(a)(1) (2012). 
 19.  See, e.g., Tom Lininger, A Better Way to Disarm Batterers, 54 
HASTINGS L.J. 525, 559–63 (2003); Lisa D. May, The Backfiring of the 
Domestic Violence Firearms Bans, 14 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 1, 11 (2005). 
 20.  514 U.S. 549, 551 (1995).  The statute at issue in Lopez, 18 U.S.C. § 
922(q), made it a crime to possess a firearm in a school zone.  Id. 
 21.  529 U.S. 598, 602 (2000).  The provision struck down in Morrison, 42 
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defendants claimed that Congress did not have authority under 
the Commerce Clause to enact section 922(g)(9).  However, unlike 
the provisions at issue in Lopez and Morrison, the domestic 
violence firearms prohibition contains an explicit jurisdictional 
element, requiring that the gun or one of its parts has crossed 
state lines.22  Ultimately, these Commerce Clause challenges 
uniformly failed at the appellate level.23 
Because the firearms prohibition applies to misdemeanor 
convictions that occurred prior to the enactment of section 
922(g)(9), another common claim focused on the Ex Post Facto 
Clause.  Defendants whose convictions (and sometimes firearms 
purchases) occurred prior to the law’s enactment challenged the 
provision as violating the Ex Post Facto Clause, arguing that they 
were being punished for behavior that took place prior to the law’s 
existence.24  However, these challenges also consistently failed 
because, as one Court of Appeals stated: 
It is immaterial that [defendant]’s firearm purchase and 
domestic violence conviction occurred prior to § 922(g)(9)’s 
enactment because the conduct prohibited by § 922(g)(9) 
is the possession of a firearm.  As it is undisputed that 
[defendant] possessed the firearm after the enactment of 
§ 922(g)(9), the law’s application to [him] does not run 
 
U.S.C. § 13981, created a federal civil rights remedy for gender-motivated 
violence.  Id. at 601–02. 
 22.  Section 922(g)(9) states:  
It shall be unlawful for any person . . . who has been convicted in any 
court of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence, to ship or 
transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or possess in or affecting 
commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or to receive any firearm or 
ammunition which has been shipped or transported in interstate or 
foreign commerce. 
See also Lininger, supra note 19, at 545, 559.  
 23.  See, e.g., United States v. Hemmings, 258 F.3d 587, 594 (7th Cir. 
2001); United States v. Costigan, 18 F. App’x 2, 4 (1st Cir. 2001); Fraternal 
Order of Police v. United States, 173 F.3d 898, 901 (D.C. Cir. 1999).  See also 
United States v. Santiago, 238 F.3d 213, 214 (2d Cir. 2001). 
 24.  See, e.g., Hemmings, 258 F.3d at 594.  See also Lynce v. Mathis, 519 
U.S. 433, 441 (1997) (“To fall within the ex post facto prohibition, a law must 
be retrospective—that is, ‘it must apply to events occurring before its 
enactment’—and it ‘must disadvantage the offender affected by it’ by altering 
the definition of criminal conduct or increasing the punishment for the 
crime.” (citation omitted) (quoting Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 29 
(1981))).  
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afoul of the ex post facto prohibition.25 
Defendants also attacked the statute on Due Process Clause 
grounds, arguing that it did not provide fair warning that 
continuing possession of firearms after a domestic violence 
misdemeanor conviction was illegal.  This claim too was 
unsuccessful in the appellate courts, which found that the statute 
made clear that possession of a firearm after conviction for a 
domestic violence misdemeanor was unlawful and further that 
“ignorance of the law or a mistake of law is no defense to criminal 
prosecution.”26  In a related claim pertaining to the knowledge 
requirement of the statute, the appellate courts found that the 
“knowing” mens rea did not require that the defendant have 
knowledge that his conduct was illegal, but simply that he have 
knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense.27  Other claims 
 
 25.  United States v. Mitchell, 209 F.3d 319, 322–23 (4th Cir. 2000) 
(citations omitted).  Other courts also rejected such ex post facto challenges to 
section 922(g)(9) on similar grounds.  See, e.g., United States v. Pfeifer, 371 
F.3d 430, 436–37 (8th Cir. 2004); Hemmings, 258 F.3d at 594. 
 26.  United States v. Denis, 297 F.3d 25, 28 (1st Cir. 2002) (quoting 
Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 199 (1991)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted); see also Mitchell, 209 F.3d at 322–23; United States v. Beavers, 206 
F.3d 706, 707 (6th Cir. 1999).  In Denis, as in other similar cases, the 
defendant argued that conviction under section 922(g)(9) fell within an 
exception to this principle recognized by the Supreme Court in Lambert v. 
California, 355 U.S. 225 (1957).  297 F.3d at 28.  In Lambert, a Los Angeles 
ordinance criminally punished felons who remained in the City more than 
five days without registering with the police.  355 U.S. at 226.  The Supreme 
Court held that, because the defendant had no notice that failure to register 
would subject him to criminal prosecution, this provision violated due 
process.  Id. at 229–30.  However, in Denis, the First Circuit rejected this 
claim, finding that Lambert has had a very narrow application and did not 
apply to the situation addressed by the court, which involved the affirmative 
act of possessing the gun, as opposed to the passive conduct at issue in 
Lambert.  297 F.3d at 29.  Further, unlike the Lambert defendant, whose 
simple presence in a city was presumptively innocent, the defendant’s 
behavior in Denis, possession of a firearm after a domestic violence 
conviction, was a “‘circumstance[] which might move one to inquire’ as to any 
applicable regulations or prohibitions.”  Id. at 30 (alteration in original) 
(quoting Lambert, 355 U.S. at 229). 
 27.  See, e.g., United States v. Hutzell, 217 F.3d 966, 967–68 (8th Cir. 
2000); Mitchell, 209 F.3d at 322.  18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2) (2012) is the provision 
which states the penalties for those who “knowingly” violate section 922(g).  
In Bryan v. United States, the Supreme Court stated that “the knowledge 
requisite to knowing violation of a statute is factual knowledge as 
distinguished from knowledge of the law.”  524 U.S. 184, 192 (1998) (quoting 
Boyce Motor Lines, Inc. v. United States, 342 U.S. 337, 345 (1952) (Jackson, 
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included arguments that the provision constituted a “bill of 
attainder,” violated the Eighth Amendment prohibition against 
cruel and unusual punishment for the underlying misdemeanor 
offense, violated the Equal Protection Clause by treating domestic 
violence misdemeanants differently from other misdemeanants, 
and violated the Tenth Amendment by usurping powers reserved 
for the states; all of these were rejected by the appellate courts.28 
B. The Supreme Court and United States v. Hayes 
Though the challenges discussed above were settled at the 
federal appellate level, section 922(g)(9) first came to the Supreme 
Court in United States v. Hayes, focusing on the question of the 
definition of “misdemeanor crime of domestic violence.”29  The gun 
ban of section 922(g)(9) applies to defendants who have been 
convicted of a “misdemeanor crime of domestic violence,” which is 
defined in 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(A) to include any offense that: 
(i) is a misdemeanor under Federal, State, or Tribal law; 
and 
(ii) has, as an element, the use or attempted use of 
physical force, or the threatened use of a deadly weapon, 
committed by a current or former spouse, parent, or 
guardian of the victim, by a person with whom the victim 
shares a child in common, by a person who is cohabiting 
with or has cohabited with the victim as a spouse, parent, 
or guardian, or by a person similarly situated to a spouse, 
parent, or guardian of the victim.30 
The issue before the Court in Hayes involved the relationship 
requirement of section 921(a)(33)(A)(ii); as the Court put it, the 
question was whether this definition “cover[ed] a misdemeanor 
battery whenever the battered victim was in fact the offender’s 
spouse (or other relation specified in § 921(a)(33)(A)) . . . [or] to 
trigger the possession ban, must the predicate misdemeanor 
 
J., dissenting)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  The Court concluded that 
“unless the text of the statute dictates a different result, the term ‘knowingly’ 
merely requires proof of knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense.”  
Id. at 193. 
 28.  See Lininger, supra note 19, at 561, 563 (discussing various claims).  
 29.  555 U.S. 415, 418 (2009). 
 30.  18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(A) (2012).   
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identify as an element of the crime a domestic relationship 
between aggressor and victim?”31 
In an opinion authored by Justice Ginsburg, the Court held 
that the former definition was correct and that a domestic 
relationship between the offender and victim need not be an 
element of the crime; instead, it is enough for the government to 
charge and prove a prior conviction for an offense that was in fact 
committed by a defendant against a spouse or other domestic 
victim.32 
In reaching this decision, the Court first examined the text 
and grammatical structure of the definitional statute.33  It then 
found that interpreting the statute to require the domestic 
relationship as an element of the misdemeanor offense would 
frustrate Congress’ purpose in enacting section 922(g)(9) because 
most of the states did not have criminal statutes that specifically 
prohibited domestic violence; thus, the gun ban would have been a 
“dead letter” in two-thirds of the states at the time of its 
enactment.34  Finally, the Court found that the rule of lenity, 
which interprets criminal statutes narrowly in favor of a 
defendant, applied only when, after utilizing traditional principles 
of statutory interpretation, a statute is ambiguous.35  Here, “[t]he 
text, context, purpose, and what little there is of drafting history 
all point in the same direction”; therefore, the statute was not 
ambiguous, and Congress defined “misdemeanor crime of domestic 
violence” to include offenses committed by a person with a 
 
 31.  Hayes, 555 U.S. at 418 (emphasis added). 
 32.  Id.  
 33.  Id. at 420–26.  The Court noted that section 921(a)(33)(A) used the 
word “element” in the singular, suggesting that it meant only the use of force, 
which follows immediately thereafter, to be a required element and not the 
offender’s relationship with the victim: “Had Congress meant to make the 
latter as well as the former an element of the predicate offense, it likely 
would have used the plural ‘elements,’ as it has done in other offense-defining 
provisions.”  Id. at 421–22.  The Court also noted that treating the 
relationship between the parties as a required element was awkward “as a 
matter of syntax.”  Id. at 422.  
 34.  Id. at 426–27 (quoting United States v. Hayes, 482 F.3d 749, 762 
(4th Cir. 2007) (Williams, J., dissenting)).  The Court noted that additional 
states had enacted such statutes since the legislation was passed, but as of 
2009, about one-half of the states still prosecuted domestic violence 
exclusively under generally applicable criminal laws.  Id. at 427 n.8. 
 35.  Id. at 429. 
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domestic relationship to the victim, whether or not such a 
relationship was an element of the crime.36 
Chief Justice Roberts, joined by Justice Scalia, dissented in 
Hayes.37  Chief Justice Roberts argued, based on text and 
structure, that the most natural reading of the statute would be 
for the domestic relationship to be included as a required element 
of the offense, and “it would be at least surprising to find . . . that 
‘a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence’ need not by its terms 
have anything to do with domestic violence.”38  The dissent also 
noted that the majority’s approach would be difficult to apply 
because often it would be necessary to go beyond the conviction 
itself to determine whether the offense on its facts involved 
domestic violence.39  Further, the dissent argued that the statute 
was ambiguous, making it a strong case for application of the rule 
of lenity.40 
A key point of dispute between the majority and the 
dissenting Justices centered on the use of legislative history to 
discern congressional intent.41  Chief Justice Roberts contested 
the majority’s use of legislative history, focusing on the floor 
statement of the bill’s chief sponsor, Senator Lautenberg.42  He 
argued that this “tidbit[] [did] not amount to much,” because the 
statement was delivered the day the legislation was passed and 
after the House of Representatives had already passed the 
pertinent provision.43  Further, whatever Senator Lautenberg’s 
purpose, it was not necessarily shared by Congress as a whole in 
passing the legislation.44  Legislators may have had differing 
views on the reach of the new law, and some may have been 
willing to agree to the gun prohibition, but only if the predicate 
misdemeanor required that the domestic relationship was an 
 
 36.  Id.  
 37.  Id. at 430–37 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 38.  Id. at 431. 
 39.  Id. at 435–36. 
 40.  Id. at 436 (“Taking a fair view, the text of § 921(a)(33)(A) is 
ambiguous, the structure leans in the defendant’s favor, the purpose leans in 
the Government’s favor, and the legislative history does not amount to much.  
This is a textbook case for application of the rule of lenity.”).  
 41.  See id. at 434–35. 
 42.  Id.  
 43.  Id.  
 44.  Id.  
SACKFINALEDITWORD.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/5/2015  3:24 PM 
2015] U.S. v. CASTLEMAN:  DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 137 
element of the offense.45 
The majority and dissent in Hayes thus disagreed about 
methods of statutory interpretation.  However, on another level, 
the Justices’ argument related to how broadly they would permit a 
domestic violence law to apply.  Must a crime of domestic violence 
be limited to the relatively few number of states that specifically 
demarcate “domestic violence crimes” in their statutes, or can a 
crime of domestic violence be identified as any one of a variety of 
crimes that exist throughout the criminal code, as long as the 
defendant had a domestic relationship with the victim?  The 
dissent’s approach would have confined what is considered a 
“crime of domestic violence” to the narrow category of crimes that 
are specifically delineated as such.46  As Chief Justice Roberts 
expressed his view, to him it was “surprising” and 
“counterintuitive” that a “crime of domestic violence” need not 
have domestic violence as an element.47 
However, the majority’s holding encompassed a wide range of 
crimes within the category of “crime of domestic violence.”48  This 
of course had the immediate impact of permitting a broader 
application of section 922(g)(9); but further, the Court 
demonstrated a more expansive vision of what is considered a 
domestic violence crime.  The fight over this vision of domestic 
violence would come back to the Court just a few years later, when 
it considered the firearms ban again in United States v. 
Castleman.49 
III. THE CASTLEMAN DECISION 
As in Hayes, the issue in Castleman centered on the definition 
of “misdemeanor crime of domestic violence.”50  However, the 
question in Castleman focused on the first part of 18 U.S.C. § 
921(a)(33)(A)(ii)—what kind of conduct could be considered “the 
use or attempted use of physical force,” a required element of a 
qualifying misdemeanor crime.51  In an opinion authored by 
 
 45.  See id. at 435. 
 46.  See id. at 431–37. 
 47.  Id. at 431, 436–37. 
 48.  See id. at 420–26 (majority opinion). 
 49.  134 S. Ct. 1405 (2014). 
 50.  Id. at 1408. 
 51.  Id. at 1409.  See supra note 30 and accompanying text for the 
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Justice Sotomayor, the Court again gave a broad reading to the 
domestic violence firearms prohibition, finding that “use of 
physical force” in the statute incorporated the common law 
definition of force—an expansive definition that included not only 
violent force, but offensive touching.52  As in Hayes, the 
Castleman Court debated principles of statutory interpretation.53  
However, Castleman also returned to the deeper issue in Hayes: 
how to conceive of domestic violence.54  Even more explicitly than 
in Hayes, the majority and concurring opinions battled over this 
core issue—the meaning of domestic violence itself. 
A. Statutory Interpretation 
The Court first turned to principles of statutory interpretation 
to determine the meaning of the “use of physical force,” which was 
part of the federal law’s definition of “misdemeanor crime of 
domestic violence.”55  It relied on a principle of interpretation that 
“absent other indication, ‘Congress intends to incorporate the well-
settled meaning of the common-law terms it uses.’”56  It found 
that there was no such “other indication” here, so that Congress 
intended to incorporate the common law meaning of force into 
section 921(a)(33)(A)’s definition of a “misdemeanor crime of 
domestic violence.”57  Because the common law meaning of force 
included “offensive touching,” rather than only more violent forms 
of force,58 the Court’s holding resulted in a broad reading of 
“misdemeanor crime of domestic violence” and, thus, broader 
applicability of the section 922(g)(9) firearms prohibition. 
In reaching this conclusion, the Court distinguished a similar 
provision that it had considered in Johnson v. United States.59  In 
 
language of 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(A). 
 52.  Castleman, 134 S. Ct. at 1410.  Justice Sotomayor’s opinion was 
joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Kennedy, Ginsburg, Breyer, and 
Kagan.   
 53.  Id. 1410–13.  
 54.  Id. 
 55.  Id.  
 56.  Id. at 1410 (quoting Sekhar v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2720, 2724 
(2013)). 
 57.  Id. 
 58.  Id. (citing Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133, 139 (2010)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 59.  Id.; Johnson, 559 U.S. 133. 
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Johnson, the issue was whether a battery conviction qualified as a 
“violent felony” under the Armed Career Criminal Act; the Act 
defined “violent felony” as one that “has as an element the use . . . 
of physical force.”60  The Court had noted in Johnson that at 
common law, the element of force in the crime of battery included 
offensive touching and stated the general principle that a common 
law term of art should be given its usual meaning, except “where 
that meaning does not fit.”61  There, the Court found a “comical 
misfit with the defined term.”62  Therefore, when defining “violent 
felony,” the Court held that the phrase “physical force” did not 
take on the broad common law meaning, but instead meant 
“violent force.”63  In Johnson, the Court explicitly reserved the 
question of whether the definition of “physical force” for purposes 
of interpreting “violent felony” under the Armed Career Criminal 
Act should extend to the meaning of “physical force” required for 
“misdemeanor crime of domestic violence” under section 
922(g)(9).64  In Castleman, the Court answered that question and 
determined that the same definition of “physical force” did not 
apply to the domestic violence firearms prohibition.65  Unlike in 
Johnson, here the common law meaning of force “fits perfectly.”66 
In explaining the difference between the statute in Johnson 
and this case, the Court first made a distinction between felony 
and misdemeanor offenses.67  Because the common law definition 
of force applied specifically to misdemeanors, it was not likely that 
Congress meant to incorporate that meaning into the definition of 
a “violent felony” in Johnson; in contrast, “it makes sense for 
Congress to have classified as a ‘misdemeanor crime of domestic 
violence’ the type of conduct that supports a common-law battery 
conviction,” under which perpetrators of domestic violence are 
routinely charged.68 
The Court argued that another reason for distinguishing 
 
 60.  559 U.S. at 135 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i)).  
 61.  Id. at 139.  
 62.  Id. at 145.  
 63.  Id. at 140. 
 64.  Id. at 143–44; see also United States v. Castleman, 134 S. Ct. 1405, 
1410 n.3 (2014). 
 65.  134 S. Ct. at 1410. 
 66.  Id.  
 67.  Id. at 1411. 
 68.  Id.  
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Johnson was that a determination that a defendant’s crime was a 
“violent felony” would classify him as an “armed career criminal”; 
in contrast, the statute at issue in Castleman grouped those 
convicted of “misdemeanor crimes of domestic violence” with 
others banned from gun possession who are not necessarily 
violent, such as substance abuse addicts, those who have entered 
the United States under a nonimmigrant visa, and those who have 
renounced United States citizenship.69 Therefore, according to the 
Court, there was “no anomaly in grouping domestic abusers 
convicted of generic assault or battery offenses together with the 
others whom § 922(g) disqualifies from gun ownership.”70 
Similar to an argument made in Hayes, the Court further 
noted that a narrow reading of the statute would have rendered it 
inoperative in many states at the time it was enacted.71  Assault 
or battery laws under which domestic violence abusers were 
routinely prosecuted can be grouped into two categories: those 
that prohibit both offensive touching and the causation of bodily 
injury, and those that prohibit only the causation of bodily 
injury.72  Therefore, if offensive touching does not qualify as 
“force,” then the federal domestic violence gun ban would have 
been inoperative in at least ten states, making up nearly thirty 
percent of the nation’s population at time of its enactment.73 
Relying on statutory interpretation, the Court therefore found 
good reason to give an expansive reading to “force” and, thus, to 
“misdemeanor crime of domestic violence” under the statute.74  
Applying this standard, the Court held that Castleman’s prior 
 
 69.  Id. at 1412 (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 70.  Id.  
 71.  Id. at 1413. 
 72.  Id. 
 73.  Id. 
 74.  Id. at 1410–13.  The majority also rejected what it called other 
“nontextual” arguments made by Castleman.  Id. at 1415.  For example, the 
defendant argued that the legislative history of the statute suggested that 
Congress did not intend for it to apply to acts involving minimal force.  Id.  
The Court found this argument unpersuasive, stating there was nothing in 
the “isolated references” of legislators to severe domestic violence that 
suggested they would not have wanted the statute to apply to a misdemeanor 
assault conviction like the defendant’s.  Id.  The Court similarly rejected 
Castleman’s rule of lenity argument, finding that the rule applies only when 
a statue is ambiguous after considering text, structure, history, and purpose.  
Id. at 1416.  The Court stated simply “that [this] is not the case here.”  Id. 
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conviction qualified as a “misdemeanor crime of domestic 
violence.”75 
B. The Meaning of Domestic Violence 
But the Court went further in justifying its broad reading of 
“misdemeanor crime of domestic violence,” and, in doing so, it 
expressed a refined and accurate understanding of the concept of 
domestic violence.  Instead of viewing “domestic” simply as a 
descriptive term modifying the noun violence, the majority opinion 
understood “domestic violence” as an independent concept: 
[W]hereas the word “violent” or “violence” standing alone 
“connotes a substantial degree of force,” that is not true of 
“domestic violence.” “Domestic violence” is not merely a 
type of “violence”; it is a term of art encompassing acts 
that one might not characterize as “violent” in a 
nondomestic context. . . . Minor uses of force may not 
 
 75.  Id. at 1413.  The Court first employed the “categorical approach,” in 
which it looked to the statute to determine whether the defendant’s 
conviction necessarily had the element of the “use or attempted use of 
physical force, or the threatened use of a deadly weapon.”  Id. at 1413 
(quoting 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(A)) (citing Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 
13 (2005); Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990)).  The Tennessee 
statute made it a crime to “commit an assault” against a family member and 
incorporated by reference another statute that defined three types of assault: 
“1) intentionally, knowingly or recklessly causing bodily injury to another; 2) 
intentionally or knowingly causing another to reasonably fear imminent 
bodily injury; or 3) intentionally or knowingly causing physical contact with 
another in a manner that a reasonable person would regard as extremely 
offensive or provocative.”  Id. (quoting TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-111(b) 
(2010); id. § 39-13-101(a)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  The Court 
acknowledged that it did not appear that every type of assault under these 
definitions would necessarily involve the use or attempted use of physical 
force or the threatened use of a deadly weapon, even under the Court’s broad 
reading.  Id.  For example, the reckless causation of bodily injury may not be 
a “use” of force.  Id. at 1414.  However, the parties did not contest that the 
Tennessee law was a “divisible statute,” meaning that the Court may apply a 
“modified categorical approach” and look at the indictment to which the 
defendant pled guilty to determine whether his actual conviction did include 
the elements necessary to qualify for the federal offense.  Id.  Here, he pled 
guilty to “intentionally or knowingly” causing bodily injury, and the knowing 
or intentional causation of bodily injury does necessarily involve the use of 
physical force, as the Court has defined it.  Id. at 1414–15.  Since the 
indictment made clear that use of physical force was an element of his 
conviction, it was a qualifying “misdemeanor crime of domestic violence.”  Id. 
at 1415. 
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constitute “violence” in the generic sense. For example, in 
an opinion that we cited in Johnson, the Seventh Circuit 
noted that it was “hard to describe . . . as ‘violence’” “a 
squeeze of the arm [that] causes a bruise.” But an act of 
this nature is easy to describe as “domestic violence,” 
when the accumulation of such acts over time can subject 
one intimate partner to the other’s control.76 
The Court thus recognized that domestic violence is in essence a 
course of conduct through which the abuser exercises power and 
control over his victim; it is a series and pattern of behaviors and 
not simply a sum of discrete acts of violence.  Domestic violence is 
not merely generic violence exhibited in a particular locale or by a 
perpetrator with a particular relationship to his victim.  It is this 
pattern of domination, and not a particular level of violent force, 
that is central to the concept of domestic violence. 
This recognition permits wider application of the domestic 
violence gun ban because a greater range of prior convictions will 
qualify as “misdemeanor crime[s] of domestic violence.”  But 
further, the Court’s recognition of domestic violence as a pattern 
of behavior with particular dynamics, rather than as discrete 
incidents of generic violence, has the potential to affect the 
treatment of a range of legal issues both at the Supreme Court 
level and in the lower courts.  Just a few examples demonstrate 
this potential.  This conception of domestic violence as a course of 
 
 76.  Id. at 1411–12 (emphasis added) (citations omitted) (quoting 
Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133, 140 (2010); Flores v. Ashcroft, 350 
F.3d 666, 670 (7th Cir. 2003)).  For this reason, the Court also distinguished 
its decision in Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1 (2004).  Id. at 1415.  In Leocal, 
the Court considered the meaning of a “crime of violence” under 18 U.S.C. § 
16, which the statute defined in part as one “that has as an element the 
use . . . of physical force.”  543 U.S. at 8–12; 18 U.S.C. § 16(a) (2012).  The 
Court stated that the ordinary meaning of “crime of violence” “suggests a 
category of violent, active crimes.”  Id. at 11.  In Castleman, the Court noted 
that the lower courts have generally held that mere offensive touching cannot 
constitute the physical force necessary for a “crime of violence,” similar to the 
holding in Johnson, which held that it could not constitute the physical force 
necessary for a “violent felony.”  134 S. Ct. at 1411 n.4; see also generally 
Johnson, 559 U.S. 133.  However, the Court noted that these interpretations 
of “crime of violence” did not apply to “misdemeanor crimes of domestic 
violence” because “‘domestic violence’ encompasses a range of force broader 
than that which constitutes ‘violence’ simpliciter.”  Castleman, 134 S. Ct. at 
1411 n.4. 
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conduct and an “accumulation of . . . acts over time”77 could 
influence the determination of what constitutes an “ongoing 
emergency” and, therefore, what statements are non-testimonial 
for Confrontation Clause purposes.78  This understanding also 
could affect the legal treatment of “imminence” and 
“reasonableness” in self-defense claims by defendants who are 
victims of domestic violence.  And, it could influence the courts’ 
determination of how the presence of domestic violence should be 
weighed in a custody or child protection decision.  In short, a more 
accurate legal understanding of domestic violence could help give 
effect to the actual experiences of domestic violence victims and 
ensure that they are treated more fairly by the legal system in a 
variety of contexts.79 
C. Justice Scalia’s Concurrence 
Justice Scalia agreed that under the facts of this case, the 
charge to which Castleman pled, “intentionally or knowing 
causing bodily injury” to a family member, had the use of physical 
force as an element and so constituted a “misdemeanor crime of 
domestic violence” under the statute.80  However, he “reach[ed] 
that conclusion on narrower grounds” and so wrote separately to 
concur only in part and in the judgment.81 
Justice Scalia would have found that the same meaning of 
physical force used in Johnson applied to the statute here and 
encompassed the conduct to which Castleman pled.82  In Johnson, 
the Court concluded that physical force meant violent force—that 
is, “force capable of causing physical pain or injury to another 
 
 77.  Castleman, 134 S. Ct. at 1412.  
 78.  See generally Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006); Crawford v. 
Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).  
 79.  See SCHNEIDER, HANNA, SACK & GREENBERG, supra note 18, at 202 
(“A central challenge facing lawyers in this field is to translate the complexity 
of battering experiences into law. . . . [T]he legal system has historically 
denied or minimized abuse in intimate relationships, and focused on single 
incidents of violence rather than grappling with the broader context in which 
these incidents occur.  To put it simply, domestic violence has been invisible 
or distorted in many legal cases in which it is relevant.”). 
 80.  Castleman, 134 S. Ct. at 1416 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and in 
the judgment).  
 81.  Id.  
 82.  Id. at 1416–17. 
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person.”83  Justice Scalia argued that if physical force was given 
the same meaning here, this was an “easy case” because “it is 
impossible to cause bodily injury without using force ‘capable of’ 
producing that result.”84  Therefore, Justice Scalia concluded that 
Castleman’s conviction qualified as a “misdemeanor crime of 
domestic violence” under that definition.85 
Justice Scalia, however, objected to the majority’s broader 
interpretation of physical force in the domestic violence firearms 
statute and to its incorporation of the common law definition of 
force, which includes offensive touching.86  He argued that there 
was no reason to interpret the phrase “use of physical force” 
differently in this case than it was interpreted in Johnson.87  
Justice Scalia made several arguments to contest the majority’s 
reasoning on this issue.88 
He argued that the principle of statutory interpretation relied 
upon by the majority, in which it is presumed that “absent other 
indication, ‘Congress intend[ed] to incorporate the well-settled 
meaning of the common-law terms it uses,’” was of “limited 
relevance” in this case, because there was such “other indication” 
here—the contesting presumption of consistent usage, that when 
Congress uses the same language, it means the same thing.89  
Since the Court had already found that the common law meaning 
of force was not incorporated into the phrase “use of physical 
force” in the statute at issue in Johnson, this presumption meant 
that Congress also did not intend to incorporate it into the 
domestic violence statute, which used very similar language. 
Justice Scalia also rejected the Court’s argument that any 
interpretation excluding offensive touching would have rendered 
the gun ban inoperative in many states at the time of its 
 
 83.  Id. at 1416 (quoting Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133, 140 
(2010)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 84.  Id. at 1416–17. 
 85.  Id. at 1417. 
 86.  Id. at 1416–22. 
 87.  Id. at 1418.  Justice Scalia also objected to interpreting the phrase 
differently than it was interpreted in Leocal, which considered use of physical 
force to define “crime of violence.”  Id.  See discussion of Leocal supra note 76.  
 88.  Castleman, 134 S. Ct. at 1418–20 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and 
in the judgment). 
 89.  Id. at 1418 (quoting id. at 1410 (majority opinion)). 
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enactment.90  He argued that “there is no interpretive principle to 
the effect that statutes must be given their broadest possible 
interpretation,” and in any event under the narrower 
interpretation, the statute “would have had effect in four-fifths of 
the States.”91  Justice Scalia found it more plausible that 
Congress enacted a statute that had effect in this large majority of 
states and “left it to the handful of nonconforming States to 
change their laws (as some have),” than that “Congress adopted a 
meaning of ‘domestic violence’ that included the slightest 
unwanted touching.”92 
Justice Scalia also countered the distinction the majority 
made between the misdemeanor crime at issue here and the felony 
crime interpreted in Johnson.93  He argued that the term being 
considered here was not simply a “misdemeanor crime,” but a 
“misdemeanor crime of domestic violence.”94  According to Justice 
Scalia, consideration of this full term leads to the “unremarkable 
conclusion that ‘physical force’ in [the domestic violence statute] 
refers to the type of force involved in violent misdemeanors (such 
as bodily-injury offenses) rather than nonviolent ones (such as 
offensive touching).”95  As indicated by this argument, in contrast 
to the majority’s approach, Justice Scalia viewed domestic violence 
merely as a type of violence.  He made this position explicit in his 
final argument, in which he took on the Court’s statement that 
domestic violence encompasses a range of force and a pattern of 
conduct.96 
D. Justice Scalia’s “Absurdity” 
It is apparent that Justice Scalia’s core disagreement with the 
majority focused on the Court’s discussion of the meaning of 
domestic violence, as he wrote extensively and vociferously on this 
point.  He called the majority’s definition of domestic violence in 
which, as he put it, “an act need not be violent to qualify as 
 
 90.  Id. at 1418–19 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and in the judgment). 
 91.  Id. at 1418. 
 92.  Id. at 1419. 
 93.  Id. at 1419–20. 
 94.  Id. at 1420. 
 95.  Id. 
 96.  Id.  
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‘domestic violence,’” an “absurdity.”97  Further, he found it 
inconsistent with definitions of “domestic violence” from the period 
of the statute’s enactment, relying on dictionary definitions such 
as “violence between members of a household, usu. spouses; an 
assault or other violent act committed by one member of a 
household against another.”98  Justice Scalia stated that 
contemporary dictionaries gave domestic violence the same 
meaning, which he phrased as “ordinary violence that occurs in a 
domestic context.”99 
He argued that the Court relied for its definition of domestic 
violence on an amicus brief filed by the National Network to End 
Domestic Violence and other anti-domestic violence organizations, 
as well as publications from the U.S. Department of Justice’s 
Office on Violence Against Women.100  He dismissed the amicus 
brief as providing a series of definitions drawn from “law review 
articles, foreign-government bureaus and similar sources,” which 
included a range of both nonviolent and nonphysical conduct that 
he said “cannot possibly be relevant to the meaning of a statute 
requiring ‘physical force,’ or to the legal meaning of ‘domestic 
violence’ (as opposed to the meaning desired by private and 
governmental advocacy groups).”101  He referred to the 
Department of Justice’s definition as “equally capacious and (to 
put it mildly) unconventional,” including “a pattern of abusive 
behavior . . . used by one partner to gain or maintain power and 
control over another.”102 
Justice Scalia attacked the amici organizations as having a 
“vested interest in expanding the definition of ‘domestic violence’ 
in order to broaden the base of individuals eligible for support 
services;” as an example, he explained that the amicus National 
Network to End to Domestic Violence had advocated for expansion 
of a program assisting victims of domestic violence to include 
victims of “dating violence” in order to “ensure that all victims in 
danger can access services.”103  By using the term “vested 
 
 97.  Id.  
 98.  Id. (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1564 (7th ed. 1999)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 99.  Id.  
 100.  Id. at 1420–21. 
 101.  Id. at 1421. 
 102.  Id.  
 103.  Id. at 1422 & n.10. 
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interest,” Justice Scalia seemed to imply that these organizations 
would be improperly motivated to provide an inaccurately broad 
definition of domestic violence; however, as his own example 
demonstrates, the “vested interest” of these organizations is to 
define domestic violence accurately so that it encompasses all 
victims who require services.104 
Justice Scalia also spoke dismissively of what he called the 
“Department of Justice’s (nonprosecuting) Office [on Violence 
Against Women].”105  He noted that the Department of Justice, 
which of course is charged with enforcing the statute at issue 
here, “thankfully receives no deference in our interpretation of the 
criminal laws whose claimed violation the Department of Justice 
prosecutes.”106  And, though he could not call the Department of 
Justice an advocacy organization with a “vested interest,” he did 
lump it with the amici to find that they all had what seemed to 
him to be a questionable purpose.107  According to him, these 
groups were, 
entitled to define “domestic violence” any way they want 
for their own purposes –purposes that can include (quite 
literally) giving all domestic behavior harmful to women a 
bad name. (What is more abhorrent than violence against 
women?) But when they (and the Court) impose their all-
embracing definition on the rest of us, they not only 
distort the law, they impoverish the language. When 
everything is domestic violence, nothing is. Congress will 
have to come up with a new word (I cannot imagine what 
it would be) to denote actual domestic violence.108 
It is hard to know exactly how to interpret this statement from 
Justice Scalia.  It could be read as disdain or sarcasm—”what is 
more abhorrent than violence against women?”  But whatever his 
intent, this invective betrays Justice Scalia’s lack of 
understanding of domestic violence.  It is not that “everything is 
 
 104.  As the majority opinion stated, these are the organizations “most 
directly engaged with the problem and thus most aware of its dimensions.”  
Id. at 1412 (majority opinion). 
 105.  Id. at 1421 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and in the judgment). 
 106.  Id. at 1422. 
 107.  Id. at 1421. 
 108.  Id.  
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domestic violence;” rather, in failing to comprehend the widely-
accepted meaning of the term as a pattern of abusive behavior 
designed to gain power and control, he is uninformed.109 
Justice Scalia’s failure to understand the meaning of domestic 
violence is highly troubling.  In Castleman, he stood alone in 
attacking the Court’s conception of domestic violence.110  
However, it is unlikely that this struggle over the legal meaning of 
domestic violence is over at the Court.  Justice Scalia has 
authored many important opinions involving domestic violence,111 
 
 109.  He revealed this lack of education in another portion of his opinion 
when he referred to a principle of statutory interpretation as a “rule of 
thumb.”  Id. at 1417.  For those familiar with the history of the legal 
treatment of domestic violence, this phrase is jarring because it is understood 
to represent the old common law principle that a man had the right of 
moderate chastisement—that is, the legal right to beat his wife as long as he 
used a switch no thicker than his thumb.  See U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL 
RIGHTS, UNDER THE RULE OF THUMB: BATTERED WOMEN AND THE 
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE 2 (1982), available at 
https://www.law.umaryland.edu/marshall/usccr/documents/cr12w8410.pdf.  
There is some dispute over whether the term “rule of thumb” had its origins 
in the context of wife-beating.  See, e.g., Marina Angel, Criminal Law and 
Women: Giving the Abused Woman Who Kills a Jury of Her Peers Who 
Appreciate Trifles, 33 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 229, 256 n.205 (1996); Phyllis 
Goldfarb, Describing Without Circumscribing: Questioning the Construction 
of Gender in the Discourse of Intimate Violence, 64 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 582, 
598 n.83 (1996); Henry Ansgar Kelley, Rule of Thumb and the Folklore of the 
Husband’s Stick, 44 J. LEGAL EDUC. 341, 342–44 (1994).  However, it is clear 
that the concept was utilized in several legal cases involving domestic 
violence in the nineteenth century.  See, e.g., Bradley v. State, 1 Miss. 156, 
157 (1824) (discussing the doctrine of “moderate correction” and the use of a 
whip or rattan; “no bigger than my thumb, in order to enforce the salutary 
restraints of domestic discipline”); State v. Oliver, 70 N.C. 44, 45 (1874) (“The 
doctrine of years ago, that a husband had the right to whip his wife, provided 
he used a switch no longer than his thumb, no longer governs decisions of our 
courts.”); State v. Rhodes, 61 N.C. 453, 454 (1868) (“The Defendant had a 
right to whip his wife with a switch no bigger than his thumb.”). 
 110.  Justice Alito, joined by Justice Thomas, wrote separately to concur in 
the judgment on different grounds. Castleman, 134 S. Ct. at 1422 (Alito, J., 
concurring in the judgment).  Justice Alito had dissented in Johnson, arguing 
that physical force under the statute in that case should have included the 
common law meaning of force.  559 U.S. 133, 146–53 (2010) (Alito, J., 
dissenting).  In Castleman, he argued that the meaning of the language in 
the domestic violence statute was the same as his interpretation of the 
statute at issue in Johnson.  Castleman, 134 S. Ct. at 1422 (Alito, J., 
concurring in the judgment).  Therefore, he would not have extended the 
reasoning of Johnson to the question here.  Id.  
 111.  See, e.g., Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353 (2008); Davis v. 
Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006). 
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and no doubt, he will continue to be a powerful voice in this area.  
Yet the Castleman majority’s expression of the meaning domestic 
violence marks an important development and provides a 
competing conception to the view articulated by Justice Scalia. 
IV. THE FUTURE OF SECTION 922(G)(9) AND THE FUTURE OF DOMESTIC 
VIOLENCE IN THE SUPREME COURT 
In Castleman, the domestic violence firearms ban withstood 
yet another legal challenge.  However, though this is the most 
recent in a long line of attacks, it may not be the last.  The  
Supreme Court’s recent Second Amendment rulings may have 
created yet another route to challenge section 922(g)(9). 
In 2008, in District of Columbia v. Heller, the Court held that 
the Second Amendment afforded an individual the right to keep 
and bear arms and that statutes that ban handgun possession in 
the home, or those that ban operable firearms in the home for the 
immediate purpose of self-defense, are unconstitutional.112  In 
McDonald v. City of Chicago, the Court found that this right was 
fully applicable to the states through the Due Process Clause.113  
In both decisions, however, the Court made clear that this Second 
Amendment right was “not unlimited.”114  As the Court stated in 
Heller: 
[N]othing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on 
longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms 
by felons and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the 
carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools 
and government buildings, or laws imposing conditions 
and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms.115 
The Court made clear that this list was meant only to provide 
examples and was not exhaustive.116  However, since Heller, there 
 
 112.  554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
 113.  130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010). 
 114.  Heller, 554 U.S. at 626. 
 115.  Id. at 626–27; accord McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3047 (quoting Heller 
language and noting that “[d]espite municipal respondents’ doomsday 
proclamations, incorporation does not imperil every law regulating 
firearms”).  
 116.  Heller, 554 U.S. at 627 n.26. (“We identify these presumptively 
lawful regulatory measures only as examples: our list does not purport to be 
exhaustive.”). 
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has been a new set of challenges to section 922(g)(9), seeking to 
test its constitutionality on Second Amendment grounds.  Though 
there have been disagreements on such issues as the standard of 
review, thus far, all of the Courts of Appeal that have considered 
the constitutionality of section 922(g)(9) post-Heller have upheld 
the domestic violence gun ban against Second Amendment 
challenges.117  Courts have reasoned that “both logic and data” 
established a substantial relation between the state’s interest in 
preventing armed domestic violence and the statute banning 
firearms for those convicted of misdemeanor domestic violence.118 
However, not all circuits have weighed in on this issue.  
Further, the circuits, and ultimately, the Supreme Court’s 
determination of the Second Amendment issue may be impacted 
by the Castleman holding.  Whether the statute serves an 
important enough state interest and is strongly enough related to 
that interest, may be affected by the Court’s broad reading of “use 
of physical force.”  For example, in the pre-Castleman case of 
United States v. Engstrum, a federal district court in Utah, using 
strict scrutiny review in a Second Amendment challenge to section 
922(g)(9), found the statute narrowly tailored to the government’s 
compelling interest in protecting household members from those 
who pose a risk of violence.119  The court’s ruling was based in 
part on the fact that the Tenth Circuit had, at that time, required 
physical force under the statute to have “some degree of power or 
violence.”120  Now, with the broader definition given to physical 
force by the Supreme Court in Castleman, the argument that the 
statute does not serve as important an interest or is not narrowly 
enough tailored to meet that interest may be strengthened.121  A 
 
 117.  See, e.g., United States v. Chovan, 735 F.3d 1127 (9th Cir. 2013); 
United States v. Booker, 644 F.3d 12 (1st Cir. 2011); United States v. Staten, 
666 F.3d 154 (4th Cir. 2011); United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638 (7th Cir. 
2010) (en banc); United States v. White, 593 F.3d 1199 (11th Cir. 2010). 
 118.  See, e.g., Skoien, 614 F.3d at 641. 
 119.  609 F. Supp. 2d 1227, 1234–35 (D. Utah 2009).  
 120.  Id.; accord Staten, 666 F.3d at 162–63 (making a similar point as to 
the Fourth Circuit’s interpretation of “use of physical force” and it’s relevance 
to the Second Amendment analysis).  See also Elizabeth Coppolecchia et al., 
Note, United States v. White: Disarming Domestic Violence Misdemeanants 
Post-Heller, 64 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1505, 1524–25 (2010) (pointing out a 
connection between the definition of the physical force requirement and a 
Second Amendment challenge). 
 121.  In Castleman, the Court summarily rejected a brief argument made 
SACKFINALEDITWORD.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/5/2015  3:24 PM 
2015] U.S. v. CASTLEMAN:  DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 151 
direct challenge to section 922(g)(9) on Second Amendment 
grounds post-Castleman may be the next chapter in the long 
history of challenges to this statute. 
In the meantime, however, the Court now has articulated a 
concept of the legal meaning of domestic violence that is more 
consistent with our actual understanding of domestic violence 
dynamics, and which can impact the outcomes of a number of legal 
issues in criminal, evidence, and family law, both at the Supreme 
Court level and in the lower courts.  This is a significant 
development and is likely the most lasting and hopeful legacy of 
Castleman. 
 
 
by Castleman that the statute should be read narrowly because “it implicates 
his constitutional right to keep and bear arms.”  134 S. Ct. 1405, 1416 (2014).  
However, Castleman did not challenge the constitutionality of the statute on 
these grounds, and the Court said that “the meaning of the statute is 
sufficiently clear that we need not indulge Castleman’s cursory nod to 
constitutional avoidance concerns.”  Id. 
